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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY USSR/Poland

REPORT

SUBJECT Soviet Military Tactics

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English-language reports on Soviet military tactical doctrine

Att. 1 Soviet Military Tactics - Attack by Three Army Groups Along a 100-Kilometer Front

This 36-page report poses the problem, and offers a solution for an attack along a 100 kilometer front by two general army groups of three armored infantry divisions, and one tank division each; one armored army group of four tank divisions; one paratroop division; one air army of 1000 fighters and 200 bombers, all supported by tactical nuclear weapons, against an enemy force of three infantry divisions deployed along the entire front, supported by two tank divisions, deployed at a depth of 50 kilometers, and tactical nuclear weapons.

Att. 2 Soviet Military Tactics - Movement to Contact and Quick Attack

This six-page report poses the hypothetical case of an attack by a combined army of three armored infantry divisions and one tank division against an enemy consisting of one infantry division with one tank division in reserve. The report briefly touches on the attacking procedures in the case of two problems: (1) when the defenders are retreating, and (2) where the defenders are entrenched.

Att. 3 Soviet Military Tactics - River Defense

This 22-page report represents in general terms Soviet methods and guiding principles, at the headquarters level, for river defense. Attention is invited to the informant comment which suggests a difference of opinion between a solution offered by informant, in a tactical problem on river defense, and a solution which was offered by Soviet General Yankovskiy, of the Obshchiy Voyskiy Kommand.

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Att. 4 Soviet Military Tactics - Attack by Three Army Groups on a 100 Kilometer Front.

This eight-page report offers a solution by another informant to the problem posed in attachment 1. The information submitted in this report includes those points which are at variance with the solution offered in attachment 1. Informant in his comment lists the composition of heavy tank regiments in the Polish Army as of 1952.

Att. 5 Soviet Military Tactics - Attack by Three Army Groups on a 100 Kilometer Front.

This 43-page report represents informant's solution to the basic problem posed in attachment 1. The report includes solutions for (1) assaults on a fortified area, and (2) controlling and breaching of a passage. Informant also presents various data on the Soviet Army.

Att. 6 Soviet Military Tactics - Attack by Three Army Groups on a 100 Kilometer Front.

This 11-page report represents another informant's solution to the basic problem posed in attachment 1. Informant's solution was essentially similar to that presented in attachment 5, and consists only of those points where there was a difference of opinion between this informant and the author of the solution in attachment 5. Informant also includes data on the deployment of forces as a result of exercises held in northern Poland in 1955, and some of the experiences gained as a result of these exercises. Ammunition tables of allowance, fuel allowances for tanks and other vehicles, food ration allowances, are also included.

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Soviet Military Tactics - Attack by Three Army Groups on a 100-Kilometer Front

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a. The Soviet force (referred to as "our forces" throughout the following report) is organized as follows:

- (1) Two General Army Groups (Obshchaya Vojskovaja Grupa) of three armored infantry divisions, and one tank division each.
- (2) One Armored Army Group of four tank divisions.
- (3) One Paratroop Division.

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(4) One Air Army of 1,000 fighter aircraft and 200 bombers.

(5) Tactical nuclear weapons.

b. The defending force is organized as follows:


(1) Three infantry divisions deployed along the entire front.

(2) Two tank divisions deployed at a depth of 50 km.

(3) Tactical nuclear weapons.

c. The initial distance between the opponents is 80 to 100 km., subsequently decreasing to 50 to 70 km. to advance elements of the defender. Between both forces is a river (300 meters wide, 5 meters deep, medium current).

d. Diagram of forces:





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- (1) Entire ground is passable for armor.
- (2) Front must be breached at a width of 100 km. only.
- (3) Task is the occupation of an important road junction at a depth of 120 km. and subsequent link-up with forces of the second "front".
- (4) There exists a vacuum of approximately 80 km. as the Soviet forces were pursuing a retreating enemy. Soviet forces were left without fuel. Retreating enemy passed through a force wall organized for defense in fortified positions (the Soviets).



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
1. The Soviet forces (our forces) in pursuit of the retreating enemy are spearheaded by the tank army as the first echelon, with the remaining armies 60-70 km. behind, as the second echelon. In front of the forces of the first echelon, there are advance groups (Podvishnoy Otried - PO), also serving as connecting elements between the forces of the first and second echelons. The responsibility of despatching the PO rests with the point division of both echelons and they are generally organized as follows: one armored infantry battalion plus one battalion which includes one SU battery and one 122 mm howitzer regiment and elements of engineers (equipment depends upon type of terrain to be traversed; for river crossings bridging equipment will be carried). The mission of the PO is the occupation of important terrain features for the follow-up divisions in order to ensure the uninterrupted movement of the main body.
2. As the armored army advances rapidly without stopping, it operates within a limited sector, presumably on a width of 50 km. (50 percent of the entire sector of operations). Behind the armored army follow the PO of the two other armies, advancing along the entire width of the front and followed by

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
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their main contingents. The situation during the pursuit is as follows:



The situation after the force has halted for refueling:



The paratroop division is located about 200 km. from the front line and at a distance of approximately 50 kms from the airfields.

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3. The Soviet Army does not generally undertake major operations with a force of less than two "fronts". At least three weeks of preparation are required for the storage of ammunition, fuel and the reorganization of units into formations of that size. During this long period of preparations the entire disposition will be of a defensive nature. The POs will advance and reorganize for defense in expectation of a possible assault by the enemy. This transition to defense is carried out in the following stages:
- a. The POs of the general army group (Obshchaya Voyskovaya Armiya) leap-frog into a position in front of the armored army and take over the first line.
 - b. After refuelling, the armored army moves to approximately 100 km. behind the front line.
 - c. Four armored infantry divisions (each division consisting of one tank brigade and three armored infantry brigades plus one tank battalion per infantry brigade) deploy on a width of 100 km.
 - d. The reorganization order of the "front" will be given in a general manner only, such as: with effect from..... day,.....hour.....until date.....hour.....the army will organize for defense in the following sectors.....etc.

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e. Roads in the front sector will be determined and classified as follows:

- (1) Divisional approaches.
- (2) Army approaches - a specified road reserved for army movement and planning.
- (3) "Front" approaches - a specified road reserved for "front" movement and planning.

On a sector of the above mentioned width there will be at least two main axes of movement and one or two railroads.

No man's land is termed Predpolie.


4. The following is the organization of the defensive layout:

- a. Each first-line division sets up a combat team, the strength of a reinforced battalion; generally the divisional reconnaissance battalion plus one tank company plus one engineer company. This force advances up to 50 km. from the first line and thereupon sends out patrols moving up to 20 km. in front of its main body, i.e., altogether there will be a screen of 70 km. in front of the first line.
- b. The advance battalions in the first line send out an infantry platoon to a distance of 2-3 km. in front of the first line in order to form a protective screen.

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- c. The entire area between the advance screen to the protective screen is patrolled by troops of the first line.
- The organization of ground for defense:



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
5. The movement of the tank army to the rear and the forward movement of the combined army is carried out as follows:
- a. In principle this operation is solely executed during the hours of darkness, while the divisions of the second echelon despatch elements to occupy the first line. Since previously, during the pursuit, the army held a line of 40 kms. width and is now being replaced by the deployment of two divisions only two brigades will be up front, whereas the third will be in the second line, so that six armored infantry battalions will move up during the first night. Each division will move up on at least two axes. The speed of advance at night will be 15 kph. During the same night, part of the rear elements of the tank army will move to the rear and the major part of the artillery of the first-line divisions will move up.
 - b. The change-over of the supporting first-line forces will be carried out by retaining the relieving support forces for one day with the force moving to the rear in order to make them familiar with the layout of the terrain, and the artillery target plan. This procedure will increase the confidence of the troops in the line.

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- c. During the second night, the remainder of the forces will move up.
 - d. Combat forces are transported by rail only when the distance to be covered exceeds 200 km. In our specific case, only the supporting forces will be transported by rail. (Note: During the Second World War, 18 trains of 100 axles each were required for transportation of one infantry division.)
6. Whereas in the past the width of unit sectors in defense between battalions was 100 meters, it has now been increased to 1,000 meters because of nuclear warfare.
- a. The battalion disposition is based on three lines: first line, second line at a distance of 200 meters from the first line, and the third line at a distance of 1,000 meters from the first line or 800 meters from the second line. The first and second line are held by two companies of infantry. An infantry battalion in defense holds an area of 2 km. width, its fire controlling an area of 3 km. Area in depth controlled by the battalion is 1.5 km.


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Disposition of a battalion in defense:




The above battalion diagram is based on the calculation that a "nominal" atomic bomb in the 20 kiloton range destructive power extends over a radius of 2 km. from point zero.

- b. A brigade defensive layout extends over an area of 6-7.5 km. at a depth of 5-6 km.

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- c. A divisional defensive layout occupies a width of 12-15 km. at a depth of 10-12 km.




- d. An Army in defense holds a sector with a width of 30-40 km. and a depth of 25 km., where the remainder of the army's divisions are deployed- mostly the tank divisions.
- e. Width of the sector held by a "front" is 100 km. at a depth of 100 km. In the offensive, a force of four divisions will be concentrated in the first line for the penetration, with two divisions holding the remainder of the front and two tank divisions as second echelon forces at a depth of 25 km. The tank army will be located at a depth of 75 km. The breakthrough will be

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planned according to the following sketch:



This plan is the accepted solution, unless ground conditions require a different approach.

- f. Doctrine requires, that when defensive dispositions - prior to the offensive - are taken up, units will organize in accordance with the pattern of the subsequent offensive, i.e., each unit in its own sector.
7. One of the principal concepts of atomic warfare requires that contact with the enemy must not be lost. Should this occur in our case, local operations with limited objectives will

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aken with the aim of regaining contact with the enemy.
ation of the intermediary defense phase will be limited
, time required for refuelling, and replenishment of am-
tion. After this the advance will be resumed and positions
en up along the river as described in paragraph 6e above.
An effort will be made to transport platoons to the other
side.

8. Until the end of 1956 two or three atomic bombs in the 20 kilotons range were prescribed for a corps attack. In addition employment of atomic artillery shells (below this standard) was considered. In case of the enemy occupying well fortified positions, a double allotment of four to six 20-kiloton bombs may be authorized.
9. In conjunction with the principal of continuous advance the above-described plan of development must be considered. The POs of the advance screen (a reinforced reconnaissance battalion) will immediately attempt to break the resistance of the enemy's advance force (operating 50-70 km. in front of the river). Should their strength prove insufficient to overcome the opposition, our PO forces will be ^{re}inforced in order to enable them to achieve this objective 2-4 days at the latest. An advance to the point of contact will be

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carried out in brigade column, with the leading battalions moving in battle formation and the remainder following in line in the brigade column.

10. Data on the length of columns:

- a. Battalion column - 5 km. on one axis.
- b. Brigade column - 12-15 km. on one axis.
- c. Divisional column - 120 km. on one axis.
- d. Intervals between elements within the column:
 - (1) Between companies - 100-150 meters.
 - (2) Between battalions - up to 2 km.
 - (3) Between brigades - up to 3-4 km.
 - (4) Between divisions - up to 5-6 km.
 - (5) Between armies - up to 20-30 km.

11. Principles of mounting an attack:

- a. Depth of operations of a "front" is approximately 250 km., operations lasting approximately 5-6 days.
- b. Under nuclear warfare conditions the width of a divisional sector during an offensive amounts to 6 km. (as compared with a width of 1-2 km. under conventional warfare conditions).
- c. In order to achieve a breakthrough, mechanized infantry and armored infantry divisions must be employed to penetrate the tactical depth. This latter term signifies

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an area where the enemy has prepared a defensive layout. In the majority of operations this will amount to the divisional depth of the first echelon divisions (i.e., under current conditions the tactical depth will be 15 km.).


- d. The tank army will be employed only after the tactical depth of the enemy has been penetrated in order to advance towards the objective and for operations within the operational depth of the enemy. The enemy's resistance to this penetration of his operational depth will take the form of committing his reserves or aerial bombardment. Our forces, however, have attained freedom of maneuver (capability of outflanking the enemy); operations against a fortified position which cannot be outflanked should not be undertaken.
- e. As a rule an attack will not be directed against an entire front line but a suitable sector for the breakthrough will be selected to be used as a pivot-point. The width of the breach must be sufficient to allow for the tank army to be pushed forward and advance to a depth of 50-60 km. at one thrust.

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- f. In order to permit the advance of the tank army, the width of the breach must be at least 20 km. (this presupposes entering the breach with two armored divisions in the first line and two in the second line; or three armored divisions in the first line and one in the second line). This calculation is based upon the following considerations:
- (1) Sixteen kilometers are required for the introduction of the tank army.
 - (2) Two kilometers are required at each flank of the breach, in order to enable the armor to operate outside the range of the enemy's antitank guns and to prevent its outflanking until exit from the tactical depth is secured.
- g. At all sectors other than the breakthrough point a division is capable of holding a front of at least 12-15 km. during the course of the offensive (the division may occupy defensive positions or constitute part of the secondary effort). Such a layout is in accord with the principle of economy of force.
- h. Penetration of the present layout requires the employment of four divisions (constituting a breach of 24 km. width)

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and for this purpose the following solutions may prove acceptable:



When command over the breakthrough is given solely to one combined army which is reinforced by two divisions and one ~~regiment~~ ^{regiment} from the second combined army, the two tank divisions of combined armies will again be in the second line.

1. In every solution the tank army will be positioned in such a manner as to enable it to traverse the tactical depth of the enemy immediately after the conclusion of the operation during the first night.

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
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- j. The sector to be breached and with it the pivot point, will be determined in accordance with the following considerations:
- (1) Task of the forces available including morale, organization, quantity and quality.
 - (2) The enemy and his deployment - including the layout of the terrain.
 - (3) Nature of terrain - obstacles, traversability.
 - (4) Time at your disposal.
 - (5) Logistical problems.
- k. For breakthrough, tanks belonging to all the units of the first and second lines should be used, but not those of the second echelon of the "front" which is to be reserved for rapid advance. This is motivated by the consideration that in breaking through an enemy disposition (until the tactical depth is reached) losses will be incurred; but, whereas loss of momentum at this phase is permissible for second line units which do not have to exploit the success, the tank army must execute its thrust at full strength.
- l. Organisation of a combined army (Obshchaya Vojskavaja Armiya) includes eight or nine divisions, consisting of

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two-thirds mechanized infantry and one-third armored infantry or tanks.

- m. There exists the possibility of putting together one or more combat teams whose task will be to advance at army level more rapidly than the remainder of the force. This team will be termed "Armsyskaya Podvishnaya Grupa". At "front" level, it will be termed "Frontovaya Podvishnaya Grupa". Within these teams, the percentage of tank formations is relatively high.
- n. Another solution which is favored by the Soviets for breaching the frontal sectors is as follows:



This means carrying out a breakthrough in conjunction with the subsidiary encirclement of part of the enemy's

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defensive disposition in order to protect the flanks of the force breaking out.

12. Support in attack.

- a. Preparations and aerial support: Following are the missions of the air army, generally placed under the command of the front headquarters in order of priority:
- (1) Local air superiority is attained by numerical superiority, destruction of the enemy flying potential especially by incapacitating his pilots, bombardment of airfields and destruction of convoys and trains carrying supplies to the theater of operations.
 - (2) Under certain circumstances destruction of enemy storage dumps of nuclear arms will be given top priority.
 - (3) Immediate preparation will be carried out (in conjunction with preparatory artillery fire) from H hour minus 90 minutes until H hour minus 20 minutes. On the average this stage of preparations will commence at H-60 minutes. Included in this stage is the harassing of enemy forces during the night of D minus or even prior to this date, with the object


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of depriving them of rest for a number of nights before commencement of the attack. The guiding principle at this stage is that aircraft will destroy targets located beyond the range of artillery fire and augment the latter's engagement of the main fortified positions to be breached.

- (4) Aircraft targets during the preparatory stage in order of priority are the main artillery deployment positions, mostly at a depth of 3-6 km., command posts, and isolation of the battle field (Isolatsya Poleboya).
- (5) Close air support of tank and infantry commences immediately following H-hour. The type principally employed for this purpose was the Sturmovik. (Note: During 1956 Polish military circles considered replacement of the piston-engined Sturmovik by jet-propelled aircraft but they finally retained the Sturmovik. Close aerial support is based on the principle of one squadron (10-12 aircraft) being continuously air-borne over the battle area of one division (a circle of 2 km. diameter) in order to neutralize enemy points of resistance. Piston-engined

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aircraft are protected by jets of the Istrebitelnaya
Aviatsya.



Aerial support during the breakthrough is concentrated on the support of the forces carrying out this operation. At a later phase - immediately after the breakthrough has been achieved, aerial support will be shifted to the support of the forces breaking out or executing the pursuit - in our case, the tank army.

b. Allocation of air support:

- (1) Number of sorties to be made is divided between the armies in advance and aircraft will not be placed under command of armies nor will any other form of support be authorized.

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- (2) A "front" is generally allotted air support by an air army of 1,000 aircraft, composed of ten air divisions. This force generally consists of two air divisions of close support bombers, four air divisions of Sturmoviks and four air divisions of Interceptor aircraft.
- (3) Allocations for the four divisions (400 aircraft) for of Sturmoviks are four or five sorties per day, operating for approximately 20 minutes over a radius of 2 kilometers. For a breakthrough of a width of 16 km. minimum requirements are for eight squadrons operating simultaneously, i.e., 80 aircraft at a time.

c. Support by nuclear weapons:

- (1) Preparatory support by nuclear weapons begins together with the artillery preparation, not later than 60 minutes before H-hour.
- (2) An army will normally be allocated approximately 10 atomic bombs (in the 20-kiloton range or less), six or seven of which will be employed during the preparatory phase while three or four will be held for use against enemy counterattacks.

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
d. Artillery support:

- (1) For the neutralization and destruction of a well dug-in enemy, a rapid 20-minute barrage by all guns is required according to doctrine. If a sufficient number of guns is available this fire is laid down at one time. If not, the fire is laid down gradually and by bounds. Improvements in earth-works, designed to withstand atomic blasts require a greater fire volume or an increased rate of fire. The Soviets solved this problem by increasing the caliber of guns, thereby increasing the amount of explosive.
- (2) The timetable of artillery support consists of artillery preparation, assault support for infantry and tanks to a depth of 3-4 kilometers in the direction of the main effort (generally, this phase will be executed by a moving artillery barrage, either single or double), and support of advance in the depth of the enemy disposition. The preparatory phase of artillery fire is concluded by extremely heavy fire on the first line trenches. H-hour signifies the termination of the artillery preparation, followed immediately by the assault of infantry and tanks on the first line trenches.

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- (3) The area of enemy defenses is divided by parallel lines spaced at 100 meter intervals. A line passing over an enemy entrenchment is termed a main line whereas a line covering an unoccupied area is known as a subsidiary line.

Enemy battalion defense positions.



The reason for the interval of 100 meters between the fire lines stems from the fact that each turn of the elevating knob equals $1/100$, corresponding to a 100-meter increase of range. A mobile screen consists in each gun of leap-frogging from a primary to a secondary line and onwards in the direction of arrow. (Shown in diagram above.)

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- (4) Firing procedure on a main line proceeds at the maximal rate of all guns, during eight to ten minutes. Fire is not advanced beyond the main line unless by order of the supported forces. Fire on a secondary line is laid down at half the rate of fire of the guns, during two or three minutes. Fire on a secondary line is moved automatically without requiring an order by the supported force.
- (5) The term "double screen" is employed when an artillery group lays down its fire concurrently on two lines. This barrage requires double the number of guns and an increase of 50 percent in ammunition. The first part of the artillery operates as usual and provides a single moving screen. The remainder of the artillery force engages solely the main lines, always selecting the next main line. Towards the end of 1956, the introduction of a triple screen was being considered.
- (6) Ammunition requirements: For artillery support during all phases of the offensive, particularly on D-day, a battle supply of 3-3.5 units of ammunition per gun must be stored near the gun emplacements.

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Battle supply of 81 mm. caliber - 120 shells.
Battle supply of 122 mm. caliber - 80 shells.
Battle supply of 152 mm. caliber - 60 shells.

During an artillery bombardment, all barrels are firing including those aimed by direct laying (including tank guns), for 5-10 minutes.

- (7) A complete moving artillery screen is not mandatory along the entire length of the frontal sector; generally, however, the entire length of the front is bombarded, in order to prevent the enemy from guessing the direction of the main effort. A complete moving screen is obligatory in the directions of the main and subsidiary efforts.
- (8) Objectives previously engaged by atomic weapons will not be shelled by artillery.
- (9) In order to lay down an ordinary moving barrage to a depth of 3-4 km. during the artillery preparation 220 pieces are required (including 81 mm. mortars) per kilometer of frontage. In the event of atomic weapons being employed, this norm will decrease.

In order to obtain the required concentrations, as mentioned above, all organic supporting artillery of second line units as well as the second echelon

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will be employed. (In our specific case, the organic artillery of the tank army will also be brought forward for this purpose.) When the tank army will advance after conclusion of the assault support phase, it will be rejoined by its organic artillery.

13. Actions prior to the attack:

- a. H-hour signifies the moment of assault of the first line of the enemy's trenches by tanks and infantry.
- b. During the night preceding the assault, reconnaissance will be carried out along the entire front. (In case of the assault being mounted during daylight hours, reconnaissance will be made at dawn.) Such reconnaissance will be of an offensive character. In each divisional sector it will be carried out by a force corresponding to a reinforced battalion task force, supported by two or three field artillery battalions. Guns will fire in this case from secondary positions only and not from positions reserved for the support of first line units. This reconnaissance force is commanded from the rear by the divisional commander. The tasks of this combat reconnaissance are as follows:

- (1) To find out whether the enemy has retreated or thinned-out his disposition (one of the lessons

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from the German method of mobile defense in World War II.

- (2) To obtain the latest information on the enemy layout and the location of his supporting arms (including the capture of prisoners).
 - (3) To occupy dominating ground on the line of contact.
- c. Engineering preparations prior to contact:
- (1) The breaching of enemy minefields will be carried out during the night preceding D-day, generally by silent means.
 - (2) For each platoon of the first wave, a lane through the minefield must be prepared. On one kilometer of frontage at least eight to ten lanes are made. Width of a lane for infantry is 6 meters, for tanks 10 meters.

14. River crossing problems:

- a. When planning an operation whose final objective is located 5-7 km. from a river, fulfillment of the mission includes the establishment of a bridgehead on the other side of the river. This latter task is allotted to the POs.

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b. Means of crossing a river:

- (1) Amphibious tanks, which will be found in the first wave of the armored units.
- (2) Boats (wood or rubber) in the engineer companies.
- (3) The divisional engineer battalion includes a DLP company (Derevyany Lielidky Park). An infantry division was capable of constructing a pontoon bridge of 50 meters length.
- (4) Included in the framework of armies are brigades of engineers (Reserv Glavnogo Komandovaniya - ROK) holding pontoons of various types, such as NZP and TPP (heavy). Each brigade holds 30 pontoons, sufficient for the construction of a bridge of 300 meters length.
- (5) At one time a corps of armored infantry maintained one-third of such a pontoon park (a pontoon bridge 100 meters long). After the disbandment of corps, this equipment was transferred to the tank divisions.
- (6) In addition to the above there was a tendency to equip armies with amphibious units.

c. The main difference between an ordinary attack and an attack including a river crossing lies in the fact, that

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in the first case the entire first echelon may be committed at once, whereas ⁱⁿ a river crossing it will be divided as follows:

- (1) The first or assault wave, in the strength of one company of each battalion of the first line, whose task is the occupation of the opposite river bank and to prevent the enemy from laying down flat-trajectory fire on the river. The crossing will be made by the assault wave during the night preceding H-hour or during the day. In the latter case a smoke screen will be laid, whose width will exceed that of the crossing proper. This wave will cross to the other bank in vessels of various description (row boats, boats pulled by cable or motor boats). Each crossing as described above will be carried out at the minimum width of 3 km.
- (2) The remaining one-third of the battalion will cross over in the returning boats, thereby enlarging the bridgehead perimeter, whereupon boats will return once more.
- (3) At the same time construction of a pontoon bridge will be started in order to facilitate the passage

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of tanks. In each divisional sector there will be at least one pontoon bridge. The army will have a separate bridge.

- (4) After the second wave has crossed, antitank guns will be ferried across on floating pontoons (the importance of this has diminished with the issue of recoilless rifles to infantry battalions). The principle is, that each offensive defensive layout requires a strong antitank disposition.
- (5) Immediately after completion of the pontoon bridges special gun-boats will begin to operate up-stream with a view of destroying floating mines.
- (6) Transfer of a division of the first line, in our case, will require 24 hours at least.
- (7) The crossing of the tank army will commence at H plus 36 hours; it will require four divisional bridges plus one army bridge plus one "front" bridge.
- (8) The number of radio sets will be increased by 50 percent in the event of a river crossing. The reason for this is, that a special net is set up for the "front" (commanding) engineer officer, who is in charge of the technical aspects of bridge construction.


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15. Time table for operations in our case:

- a. Transfer of the first waves will require one or two hours.
- b. Breaching the enemy's layout at tactical depth will require eight to ten hours, at the rate of 1-1.5 kph.
- c. The tank army will begin river crossing at H plus 36 hours.


16. Combat methods after river crossing:

- a. As previously described, each wave occupies a bridgehead which is deepened by consecutive waves until the entire force of the first echelon is located within the bridgehead.



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- b. Immediately upon enlargement of the bridgehead, all antitank weapons are moved to the other bank where they will be positioned at the flanks in order to prevent attacks by tanks and elimination of the bridgehead from the flanks.



- c. Within the brigade sector of the defensive layout at the bridgehead, the third battalion, constituting the second echelon, will be deployed at a depth of 3-4 km.
- d. As such a bridgehead is vulnerable to nuclear attacks, the tank army will be deployed for a forward thrust when no signs of an enemy attack are evident.
- e. Liquidation of the operational reserves of the enemy is the task of the tank army. However, it will engage them only in the event that these reserves deny attainment of the objective. Otherwise the tank army will advance rapidly to achieve the mission by way of maneuver and will avoid unnecessary combat.

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f. Employment of air-borne troops:

- (1) Paratroops will be employed solely within the operational depth and will not be dropped on the fortified tactical disposition of the enemy.
- (2) Paratroops will be dropped on locations where a link-up may be effected within 24 hours at the latest.
- (3) The implication is that a paratroop division lacks the strength and the quality of the standard infantry division, with a resultant temporal limitation of its power to hold a position.

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COUNTRY:

USSR

SUBJECT:

**Soviet Military Tactics: Movement to Contact
and Quick Attack**

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The Problem:

1. Enemy layout of one infantry division is deployed over an 80 km front surrounded by natural and artificial obstacles. The enemy holds one tank division in reserves.
2. Our forces, i.e., Soviet, consist of the Combined Army:
 - a. Three armored infantry divisions
 - b. One tank division
3. Distance between the two forces is 60 km.

The Objective:

To pass through no man's land (60 km), possessing no exact information concerning the enemy layout.


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
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Sketch of the Forces:



Soviet forces:



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
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Movement to Contact

1. At a distance of 60 km from the enemy, knowledge of his presence in the area may be taken for granted. On the other hand, intelligence may have no indications of the enemy's strength, his exact layout, or of the nature of his deployment.
2. It may be assumed that on a frontal sector with a breadth of 80 km there exist at least three main axes of advance, or six axes, each division advancing on two axes in regimental columns.
3. There exist two possibilities of movement to contact in accordance with conditions prevailing at the front:
 - a. In the event of the Soviet forces being in pursuit and the enemy in retreat, the tank division will advance in the center with two armored infantry divisions at its flanks; the third armored infantry division will be at the second echelon, at the rear of the tank division.



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- b. In the event of the situation being static and the Soviet forces passing a zero line in order to advance (movement of forces into enemy territory), the three armored infantry divisions will move in the first echelon, each division on two axes of advance, and the armored division will move in the rear of the center armored infantry division. (Allowance must be made for the fact that, owing to the lack of maps, no limitations of the terrain have been considered.)
4. In any event, the advance will proceed in such a way that the reconnaissance units will move in front of the main body up to a distance of 50 km; each division will be preceded by a reconnaissance battalion, reinforced according to circumstances. The force proper will advance as follows:
- a. The first battalion will move in combat formations.
 - b. The remainder of the force will move in files.

Assault on an Obstacle

5. Since in this case the army commander's objective is to move forward to a distance of 100 km in a certain direction, without exact intelligence information, the commander of the advance echelon, after assessing the situation (battalion and regiment) will formulate his plans and attack at once.

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6. If the attack fails, the divisional commander will carry out an attack in order to determine the dividing line between the enemy units. Should this succeed, the main army body will pass through this breach and continue to advance in accordance with its mission.
7. If this attack also fails, the army commander will formulate his plan and attack at once. A quick attack by an army consisting of four to seven divisions should not require more than five or six hours in the preparatory stage.
8. A planned attack will be mounted only if the quick attack of the army also fails and it becomes apparent that the enemy occupies fortified defensive positions. In this case the time table will be as described above.
9. With regard to timing calculations, it is possible to make preparations for a quick attack by an army in such a short time because of the existence of a standing operational procedure which is adapted to such an exigency. The reconnaissance groups, for instance, at all levels, will be organized in such a manner as to include at the same time the orders groups.

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10. The principles of attack, as stated above, will also apply in case of a quick attack by divisions, each division in its own sector attempting to establish a pivot point to breach the enemy lines, and the same applying to the army. Generally, the entire length of the front will not be attacked by dispersed forces.

Enemy Reserves

11. If the enemy reinforces his troops by employing his reserves (his armored division), the entire army will be committed to breach the enemy layout, tanks or tank destroyers being allotted the task of creating antitank barriers.

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COUNTRY:

USSR

SUBJECT:

Soviet Military Tactics: River Defense

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1. All ranks, from the individual soldier to the division, are trained to emphasize aggressiveness in all kinds of combat. Aggressiveness in defense is expressed in the form of counterattacks. Counterattacks, however, may be carried out only on authorization from the superior headquarters, and this

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rule applies up to and including the division. The reason for this is that units up to the divisional level are capable of executing only tactical counterattacks, which may prove undesirable. For example, in the event that the enemy breaks through the two main lines, the subordinate commander may decide to close the breaches, thereby completely exposing the third line and enabling the enemy to penetrate it more easily.

2. Defense around a river obstacle is based on the following principles:

- a. First line - a chain of dominant ground features from which flat trajectory fire may be directed at the opposite bank, the river itself and our bank.
- b. Line of advanced positions will not be on the river bank, but at a distance of 500-600 meters from it, depending on topographical factors. This distance will constitute the killing ground of light machine guns in conjunction with medium machine guns.
- c. The entire force must be deployed behind the obstacle (river) in such a manner that the enemy will be prevented from carrying out landings or crossings. In the event

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the enemy succeeds in so doing, he must be repulsed by the introduction of all forces of the second lines or echelons into the first lines. The tank division also may be deployed in the first line if sufficient other forces for the defense are not available.¹

- d. As defense against river crossings, special forces are set up whose task is the destruction of the enemy river-crossing potential (Protivdesantny Rezerv). In our case this force will be composed of three antitank artillery regiments.
3. On open (exposed) ground a division will occupy a frontal sector 15 km wide and 12 km deep. Armor will be positioned behind the center of the front, at a distance of 35-40 km from the river bank. Mechanized or armored infantry divisions of the second line will be positioned at a distance of 20-25 km from the first line. The exact location of the second echelon force will be determined in accordance with the available road-net and the natural cover offered by the ground.
4. In case the enemy does not hold the far river bank, or retreats

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after an unsuccessful attempt to cross the river, the disposition of troops will be as follows:

- a. From each first line armored infantry division, a battalion combat team, reinforced by tanks, will be sent forward to a distance of 10-12 km. The tasks of these units are:
 - (1) To force the enemy to deploy and fight.
 - (2) To fight a withdrawal battle. (It is for this reason that they are reinforced by armor.) During the withdrawal of the armored infantry, tanks will lay mobile ambushes.
- b. One or two tank battalions will be placed between the battalion and the river.
- c. At least two bridges will be maintained across the river and bridgeheads will be held by forces up to regimental strength. The task of the bridges' protection force is to prevent their capture by paratroops, partisans (demolition), or even the penetration of fast enemy armor. All other bridges will be blown up and a pontoon reserve will

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
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be maintained on the other bank of the river in order to erect an improvised pontoon bridge, if required.

- d. Divisional reconnaissance battalions will operate in front of the battalion combat teams, up to a distance of 50 km, in order to form a screen. The tasks of the screen are:
- (1) To report information on the strength of the enemy and direction of the main effort.
 - (2) To force the enemy to deploy and fight.
- e. Should the battle on the enemy bank be inconclusive, no forces will be drawn from the main defense line (Paredny Kray Obekony) to repulse enemy attacks.

Main line of resistance

Reserve pontoons in case of emergency



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5. Support in Defense

a. Responsibility of organizing support in defense:

- (1) At battalion level the commanding officer is responsible for planning battalion fire. He also checks the location of each weapon, particularly of the medium machine guns, including their field of fire.
- (2) At regimental level, the regimental commander organizes and is responsible for high trajectory fire. Actual execution, however, rests with the regiment artillery group commander (Komanduiushche Artilleriskiy Grupe), including the medium and field artillery, and all 82 mm mortars. The artillery commander of the regiment (Nachalnik Artilerii Polka) is responsible for the flat trajectory fire, including antitank defense. (The regiment sector is termed "Uchastok") Supporting the regiment in defense is the artillery regiment (two or three field artillery battalions) of which two or three batteries may be allotted as general support to an armored infantry battalion.

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(3) At the divisional level, flat trajectory fire is planned and controlled by the commander of the divisional artillery group (Nachalnik Artilerii Divizii) and on the field proper by the operations officer (Nachalnik Operativno Otdela). High-trajectory fire is the responsibility of the KDAO (Komanduiushchi Divizii Artileriskiy Grupe). If, as may frequently occur, the division is allocated support of less than two artillery regiments, it will be under orders of the artillery group commander.

b. Categories of defensive fire:

(1) Linear fire. This is fire laid down in front of the Soviet positions. In case of well dug-in troops, the safety range will be 100 meters; otherwise the safety range will be 200 meters. All weapons are laid on these lines, unless employed on other fire tasks. The purpose of linear fire is to prevent the enemy from attacking the forward positions, i.e., danger fire. It is called down by special code and will be applied

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at the maximum firing rate of all weapons. A group of 122 mm howitzers is allotted a line of 300 meters (in view of the fact that the destruction radius of a shell is 25 meters), whereas 120 mm heavy mortars are allotted a line of 500 meters (the destruction radius of a bomb being 45 meters). The accepted calculation for the planning of a divisional sector in defense (division of the first echelon) is 25 pieces per kilometer of frontage; this calculation includes 82 mm and 120 mm mortars, artillery of all echelons, as well as antitank guns. Organic artillery of the second echelon will not be taken into consideration for this purpose. Tanks are not included as they are principally regarded as assault weapons and not as a static fire power.

- (2) Danger fire (Nepodvishnoy Zagraditelny Ogon; NZO), laid down as a rule by the entire battalion. According to calculations a 122 mm battery covers an area of six hectares, at a safety range of 300-400 m. Time of

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operation is two minutes at rapid rate and three minutes at slow rate (sometimes termed ZO).

- (3) Defensive fire (Podvoshnoy Zagraditelny Ogoni; PZO) is a barrage moving to the rear, beginning at approximately three km from the front line and shifting by bounds of 300-500 meters; its task is to isolate tanks from infantry.
- (4) Harassing fire (Dalneye Ognovoy Napadeniy; DON). Medium and heavy artillery (122 mm guns, 152 mm guns and howitzers) hit selected targets.
- (5) Disruptive (?) fire Nepos Redstvennye Ogoni; NO) is applied by direct laying and employed for the breaking-up of enemy attacks.
- (6) Counterattack fire by Soviet forces will be laid down by battalion concentrations. A barrage will seldom be used.
- (7) Preparatory counter-battery fire (Protiv Artileriiskaya Podgotovka) is preventive fire against enemy artillery attacks. It is planned to be laid down, immediately

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prior to the enemy's artillery preparation, on a narrow zone and on the assumed enemy assault disposition. There also exist alternative plans which do not allow, however, for major changes to be introduced. Such fire will only be planned for the layout of one of the divisions employed in the main effort. Calculations call for 100 pieces per kilometer of frontage for 30 minutes. Planning responsibility for this type of fire rests with the army commander. Firing is only from secondary and adjacent positions. Execution is by all artillery groups located in this direction (divisional, army, and "Front").

c. Engineering support in defense:

- (1) Each first-line division will be reinforced by engineer troops whose tasks are to lay mine fields and conduct engineering reconnaissance. The latter task will be a major one if there is a river obstacle behind which a defensive layout is planned. Specifically the tasks of the engineering reconnaissance are as follows:
 - (a) To become familiar with the nature of the river and its fords.

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- (b) To conduct intelligence reconnaissance: reconnaissance and observation of obstacles. This reconnaissance will also set up independent observation posts in order to collect information on enemy preparations with regard to the type of pontoon or other types of bridges which will be constructed and where; which types of mines are used, etc.

(2) Mines

- (a) The object of a mine field is to prevent the enemy from penetrating the perimeter. Mine fields are differentiated according to the type of mine, i.e., an antitank mine field, an anti-personnel mine field, or a field with both types of mines. Mine fields are also differentiated according to phases of alert:

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| Alert I
(Gotovnost) | - Mine field is completely ready, camouflaged in front of defense line as well as inside the defense perimeter. |
| Alert II | - Holes for mines are dug and the mines are placed with detonators beside them. |
| Alert III | - Mines are dumped in the area to be mined and holes are dug. |

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- (b) Mines will be laid in a number of rows, never less than ten. The norm for laying a mine field: one engineer platoon (?) lays one square kilometer in five hours.
 - (c) In a divisional defense sector, 3000 mines per one km of frontage are laid, at an average depth of 100 meters (approximately four rows). Antitank mines are laid at a distance of five meters from each other, with anti-personnel mines in the gaps between them.
 - (d) When the area is organized for defense, mine-laying is given top priority. (Raboty Parvoy Koleynosty).
- (3) First priority assignment are carried out by the first-line division, supported by two engineer battalions for five or six days, and by motor transport (MT). (This is true on the average ground encountered in Poland and the Ukraine.) Such assignments are carried out in the following order:

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- (a) Clearing of firing lanes
 - (b) Minelands
 - (c) Barbed wire fences
 - (d) Dug-outs (individual and platoons)
 - (e) Observation posts
- (4) Second priority assignments (Raboty Vtoroi Koleynosti) are carried out in the following order:
- (a) Communication trenches
 - (b) Mining in depth
 - (c) Command posts for all echelons
- Note: Up to, and including, the battalion level, observation posts are identical with command posts.
- (5) Camouflage:
- (a) Tactical camouflage (Takticheyskaya Maskirovka), which is carried out at all levels, from the individual soldier up to the unit level.
 - (b) Operational camouflage (Operativnaya Maskirovka) or deception (Desinformatiya). Deception plans

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are prepared at army level, at the minimum. They are prepared by the army operations officer together with the commander of engineers of the army and coordinated with the executing troops. There exist dummy columns (Samokhodniye Voyska) adapted to mobile operational troops. All deception plans are coordinated with the Military Transportation Department (Voyenniyye Soobshcheniya; VOSO), which includes railroads and inland waterways.

6. Positions of Commanders and Headquarters

- a. The battalion: the battalion commander, together with the forward command group which includes the commander of artillery allotted for support, are at one point which constitutes both command and observation post.
- b. The regiment: in defense, the regimental commander will be positioned 1.5 - 2 km from the first line. Ordinarily he is not permitted to be in the first line; however, in the event that direct participation of the commander is essential to success, then he may move to the first line. The observation

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post of the regimental commander must be suitable in respect to the following:

- (1) It must enable him to be located in the direction of his main effort (during an attack: one km from the line of contact).
- (2) It must be located near the regiment reserve (the battalion and other elements of regiment second echelon).
- (3) The commander of the artillery team must be within trailing distance.
- (4) It must afford visual observation of the battlefield.
A command post will always be located within the perimeter of the second echelon battalion.

c. The division:

- (1) During an attack the divisional commander will be positioned at a distance of two km from the line of contact.
- (2) In defense, the divisional commander will have a main observation point on vital ground, approximately two - 2.5 km from the first line of defense. The commander

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of the divisional artillery group will be in the immediate vicinity of the divisional commander, either within hailing distance, or at the same observation point.

- (3) The command post is located in the second echelon with the divisional reserve.

d. The Army and "Front"

Army and "Front" commanders have observation points prepared in advance or use those of divisional commanders. These observation points will generally be occupied during the decisive stages of the battle; in an attack, mainly at the beginning of the assault or during the repulsing of a counterattack; in defense, during a counterattack by Soviet forces. The army commander will stay at these observation posts together with his staff. The command posts are located in the second echelon of the army or "Front".

7. Division Elements in Defense:

- a. First echelon units.
- b. Second echelon units or general reserve.
- c. Mobile antitank reserve (Podvizhnoy Protivtankovo Rezerv),

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which includes towed or self-propelled antitank guns, mostly one battalion of 100 mm antitank guns (12 pieces).

- d. Armored reserve (Tankovy Rezerv), which will be composed of approximately one tank battalion (up to one tank regiment).
- e. Engineer reserve (Podvishnoy Otriad Zagrazhdeniya).

In defense, this consists of up to one engineer battalion, also termed "mobile obstacle group". It is composed of assault pioneers with a supply of APC mines. One such engineer company is normally allocated a dump of 2,000 - 3,000 antitank and anti-personnel mines, and it operates in conjunction with the mobile antitank reserve.

- f. Artillery reserve (Artileriskii Rezerv), which includes one to two field artillery battalions. This reserve does not engage in firing during any stage of operations and its position is well camouflaged. Its mission is to commence operations if the enemy destroys any support elements by nuclear attack.
- g. Anti-paratroop reserve (Protivo Desantnoi Rezerv). In defense, this consists of the divisional reconnaissance battalion, reinforced by tanks. (During an offense,

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
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no such reserve is set up.) The Soviets do not believe that an enemy will drop paratroops on their lines of communication; should this happen they will be dealt with by the rear services.

- h. Anti-river crossing reserve (Protiv Kuternaya Oborona), composed of an antitank battalion and tank destroyers.
- i. Chemical warfare reserve.
- 6. An oblique line of positions is laid in front of the first line positions (Riglanaya Positsya):



Its functions are:

- a. To prevent the enemy from breaking through at the flanks.
- b. To draw enemy fire at a line held thinly by Soviet troops.

The enemy will waste ammunition on this line and will arrive in a weakened condition at the real main defense position.

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c. To form a position for mounting a counterattack.

9. Communications in Defense:

- a. Communications in defense will be mainly be telephone, the lines for which will be laid underground. Radio will be used only if the use of telephone communications is not feasible.
- b. The responsibility for establishing communications rests with the higher echelon unit, which will set up communications with the lower echelon (the communications officer and personnel in the regiment belong to the divisional signals battalion), and between adjacent units, from left to right. Communications with technical units are established by the infantry to the technical unit, except for artillery which provides communications with infantry units formations (personnel and equipment).
- c. The principle of "lowering" communications, as described above, means that in an infantry regiment, for example, the communications officer (Nachalnik Napravleniya Sviazi), who belongs to the divisional signals battalion, will see to it that communication with his headquarters, i.e.,

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the division, will continue to function during all movements of the regiment.

10. Storage Dumps in Defense

- a. Ammunition. The objective is to push ammunition forward. Infantry positions will receive $\frac{1}{2}$ battle supply and at each gun position $\frac{3}{4}$ or one complete battle supply will be dumped. On battalion fighting echelon transport $\frac{1}{4}$ battle supply will be provided. On regiment fighting echelon transport $\frac{1}{4}$ battle supply will be provided. At the division there will be $\frac{1}{2}$ battle supply.
- b. Fuel. The division will hold three battle supplies: one on MT, one at the regiment, and one at the division.
- c. Food supplies. There will be a total of five rations: one combat ration with the soldier, one ration at the battalion kitchen, one ration at the regiment, and two rations at the division.

11. Air Support in Defense

- a. Only the "Front" is allotted an air army and will allocate sorties to armies.

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- b. Liaison officer to the air force will only be at the divisional level.
- c. Allocation of sorties. The distribution list by priority is as follows:
- (1) The major portion of sorties will be allocated for the counterattack phase.
 - (2) Reconnaissance.
 - (3) Air defense.
 - (4) According to the new tables of organization, one reconnaissance squadron will be included in the tank and armored infantry division. This, however, was still in the planning stage.

1. Comment: The graduation exercise included the defense of a river for which he was allotted sufficient forces of armored infantry units. Since the terrain included ground which was impassable for armor, he concentrated his tanks at a distance of five to ten km behind the river. The commission awarding the degree included, among others, the Chief of the Polish General

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Staff and the Soviet General Yankovsky of the "Obshchaya Voenkovoy Komand". The latter was displeased with the offered solution and, instead of awarding the informant a "mark 5" (excellent), he proposed to award only a 4. Gen. Yankovsky was of the opinion that all forces should be deployed in the first line of defense, and that a concentration of reserves should not even be considered. Only when the Polish Chief of the General Staff threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the Polish Minister of Defense did the general admit that the offered solution was excellent and agreed to award a "mark 5".

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COUNTRY: UBSR/Poland

SUBJECT: Soviet Military Tactics - Attack by Three Army Groups on a 100-Kilometer Front

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1. At least two artillery divisions - one to each army executing the breakthrough - should be added to disposition of Soviet attacking forces. There is no vacuum between the forces. All remaining fuel is issued to motorized elements which continue the pursuit of the enemy.

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2. Continuation of the advance to the river is executed only by one army which advances with three divisions. The tank division of the general army (obshchaya armiya) forms the second echelon. The army continues up to the river, where it attempts to establish at least two bridgeheads. (There is almost no operation or exercise in which the Soviet forces have advanced more than 400 kilometers without establishing at least two bridgeheads; in the advance from the Dneper to the Don, for example, a bridgehead was established south of Kiev.)
3. The army in pursuit is given the assignment of breaching a river obstacle (forsirovat' reku s khoda). Since only one army is in pursuit, two armies at the rear fuel up and continue the momentum when the pursuing army is halted (because of the enemy has employed atomic weapons against the bridgehead) and executes quick defense (pospeshnaya obrona).
4. Preparations for the planned attack of a front take at least a fortnight. After three to four days the front commander issues an operational order and convenes a meeting of command groups so that army commanders have two-thirds of the period for issuing orders and practical attack preparations.
5. A mechanized division in pursuit occupies a front of up to 50 kilometers, depending upon the terrain.

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6. The advance of a mechanized division is executed on at least three to four axes.
7. Each formation or unit is given a 24 or 48-hour task which appears in the operational order in the following form: "at the end of....(day) you should reach....(map reference) and break through (or stay behind) line....of defense belt.... of the enemy, within the limits of....(map reference)".
8. The tank army is not employed to break through the enemy line until a breach has been made. The calculation is that the tank army will advance 20 kilometers on the first day, 30 to 40 kilometers on the second and third days, and at least 50 kilometers after the fourth day.
9. The first day's assignment (conditional upon the strength of the enemy layout) includes the entire first belt or two lines within the first belt of the enemy.
10. The second day's assignment consists of the entire second belt or part of it.
11. Forced breaching of a river is executed in such a way that the first wave of tanks cross on 60-ton pontoons. Construction of a (water level - niskovodnyy) bridge over a river 300 meters wide takes at least 48 hours, and a normal bridge is built within the ensuing four or five days. The front builds at least one bridge for each division. The pontoon

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battalion of a tank division has a pontoon bridge 50 to 60 meters long. The bridges are partially assembled in woods near the river about a week before ^{the} breakthrough.

12. Small (five-kiloton) tactical atomic weapons have a destructive radius of 300 meters for tanks, 1,000 meters for troops not in trenches, and 400 meters for troops in trenches. A 20-kiloton atomic bomb has a destructive radius of 400 to 500 meters for tanks, and 1,500 meters for infantry not in trenches. Atomic weapons are only employed in the face of strong resistance.

Movement to Contact

13. Order of movement as in the aforementioned solution: mechanized infantry divisions in front, only two for the frontal width, and one mechanized infantry division and one tank division as second echelon. There is a quick attack at divisional level, and the army commander allots second echelon reserves to each division encountering difficulties or resistance.


Defense

14. The defense is based in the main on a double defense belt, each belt of which is composed of three defense lines:

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15. Tanks of infantry formations may be placed from the first line of defense back to a maximum of one kilometer from the front, terrain permitting.
16. A tank regiment has 85 tanks.
17. A mechanized division has the following composition:
 - a. Two to three mechanized regiment, each of which is composed of a tank battalion of 21 tanks.
 - b. One medium tank regiment which has 85 tanks.
 - c. One heavy tank regiment, strength unknown.¹
18. In the mechanized corps, which in most cases comprise three mechanized divisions, there was a special heavy tank regiment directly subordinate to corps headquarters, which had 120 to 130 tanks and heavy assault guns.
19. In the USSR, tank divisions were subordinated to General Headquarters and were allocated or attached to each front.

Occupation of a Town Junction

20. The tanks attack at night or twilight, while reconnaissance units overcome listening posts and ambushes and try to break through without atomic weapons. Field artillery battalions attack enemy guns.
1. Source Comment: Following was the composition of heavy tank regiments in the Polish Army: one heavy tank (JS-2) company

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with 16 tanks; one SU-100 company equipped with (10 ?) tank destroyers; one SU-122 company equipped with (10 ?) guns; and one SU-152 company with 10 guns. The latter company did not exist in all heavy brigades.

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COUNTRY:

USSR

SUBJECT:

**Soviet Military Tactics - Attack by
Three Army Groups on a 100-Kilometer
Front.**

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Assaults on a Fortified Area,

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Movement to Contact, Defense, and Problem No. 2

- Controlling and Breaching of a Passage.

**Miscellaneous data on the Soviet Army has also
been provided.**

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Assaults on a Fortified AreaStandard Composition of Soviet Armies

1. The tank army (tankovaya armia) is composed of three or four tank divisions, including support and services.
2. The combined army (obshchaya voyskovaya armia) is composed of the following:
 - a. Four or five divisions of armored or mechanized infantry.
 - b. One or two tank divisions.
 - c. One or two artillery divisions (approximately 320 guns to the division.)
 - d. One or two antiaircraft artillery divisions.
There are two regiments to the division, with each regiment consisting of two medium anti-aircraft artillery battalions and one heavy antiaircraft artillery battalion.
 - e. One heavy tank regiment.
 - f. One engineers regiment.
 - g. One pontoon regiment.

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- h. One atomic artillery battalion.
 - i. One guided weapons battalion.
 - j. In general support: One or two air divisions.
 - k. In general support: Twenty atomic bombs of 20 kilotons (for armies operating in the direction of the main effort.)
3. In addition to the above, there exists the air army (vozdukhnaia armia), which is part of the Air Force.
4. Parachute divisions are not part of the front proper. They are subordinate to the High Command (Glavnoe Komandovo) and are allocated for specific support missions only.
5. Nowhere does there exist a vacuum of 80 kilometers between the Soviet forces and the enemy. When large formations run out of fuel (as demonstrated in this case), replenishments are at once brought up to the reconnaissance units to enable them to continue their advance and regain contact with the enemy.

Situation and Enemy Order of Battle

6. An enemy force, composed of three infantry divisions and two tank divisions in reserve, when deployed behind a river on a

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front 100 kilometers in width while smaller units and observation posts are maintained 50 to 70 kilometers from the river will, according to Soviet concepts, be laid out as follows: On a sector of the frontage there will be at least two bridges, which may be held by any of the following:

- a. The main force in the south.
 - b. Bridgeheads held by a force corresponding to a reinforced armored infantry regiment, while the main force is deployed on the other river bank.
 - c. Bridgehead held by a force corresponding to two armored infantry regiments and one tank battalion, with advance forces sent out as a screen and defense in depth on the other river bank.
7. The defended area is constructed of security belts (in Polish: pasywe sloniani). All infantry units are concentrated within the same belts, and the tank divisions occupy defensive positions to the rear, ready to counterattack.

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
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Solution to Exercise

8. Movement to contact: Within the given width (and lacking maps), immediately after refueling has been completed, forces will advance. There will be four divisions abreast on the entire width: two tank divisions in the center, and two armored infantry divisions advancing on the flanks. Each division will move along two main axes; the length of the divisional column will therefore be approximately 60 kilometers. Movement will be made in columns of regiments, and the interval between regiments one to two hours or approximately 15 to 30 kilometers.

Sketch of Movement Pattern**SECRET**

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9. In the present situation, with a vacuum of 80 kilometers and an additional space of 50 to 70 kilometers from the location of the advance forces to the obstacle (river), the four divisions of the point will start out at 2000 hours, and contact with the advance forces of the enemy will be established at 0200 hours. According to planning, encounter will last from 30 to 60 minutes and advance will be resumed in the direction of the river. Troops will reach the river at about 0500 hours and will manage to establish a bridgehead.
10. Length of columns:
- a. A battalion column of tanks moving along one axis - 4 kilometers.
 - b. A regimental column of tanks moving along one axis - 20 kilometers.
11. Specification of method of movement to contact of the four advancing divisions, by order of movement:
- a. Advance guard - one tank or armored infantry battalion.
 - b. Antitank reserve - one company (1-2 batteries) of type SU-100.


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- c. Bridging material - one pontoon battalion
(pontoon bridge of 300 meters' length only.)
- d. Engineers reserve - one company of engineers
(for the repair of roads, bridges, etc.)
- e. Tank regiments.
- f. Armored infantry regiments.

The armored infantry division will move in such a manner that the tank battalions of the armored infantry regiments will move at the same level as, or among, the tank regiments of the tank divisions, on their own axis of advance of course.



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Principles of Attack

12. The forces will advance immediately, in the formations as described above, and contact with advance elements of the enemy will be made by the screening force. The battle which will take place will be made by overrunning, with the major part of the force continuing to advance, even attempting to outflank the enemy's forces without fighting them. The object is to get to the river, to either capture an enemy bridgehead or to establish their own.
13. To carry this out, movement will be at night and all encounters will be fought during the nighttime, until the first light of dawn, so that one bridge head at least will be established across the river by 0600 hours.
14. In the event of an initial attack, as described above, in a failure, another attack will be made within four or five hours, even if this requires a daylight battle and all that it implies in respect to atomic danger. During the course of this battle, advance will be maintained in the direction of the river while attempts are made to establish a bridgehead.

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
15. Timing calculations for a hasty attack by a front require a span of 1-2 days. This timing is determined by time required to prepare the artillery positions and that required to range the guns.
16. Preparations for a normal attack by a front require 7-14 days, according to the requirements of ammunitions to be brought up, the refueling, the siting of artillery, etc.
17. Calculations and employment of nuclear weapons: An assault by nuclear weapons will be delivered at a distance of 5-10 kilometers, in order not to endanger its own forces. Since, by hasty planning, battle will be fought during nighttime, two atomic bombs will be allocated to each break-through army. Three-fourths of the atomic bombs will be delivered on targets at the tactical depth and one-fourth will be delivered on targets at the operational depth.
18. Organisation of forces for a planned attack: The break-through sector of an army is usually 15 kilometers of the frontage. The break-through sector of a division is usually 6 kilometers of the frontage. The regiment is also organized in depth for the assault as follows:

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
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A division is organized for the assault as follows:




In accord with the stated plan, the front will carry out a break-through on a frontal sector of four divisions abreast, i.e. 24-25 km. of frontage:

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19. In the event of a preplanned assault, of the kind which requires extensive preparations, break-through will be executed under the command of front headquarters, axis of break-through being in the center. A reserve or second echelon will be set up which will include the tank divisions of the combined armies, as well as an armored infantry reserve from both of the combined armies.
20. The tank army will be located at a distance of 40 to 60 kilometers from the front, to be out of range of enemy atomic artillery.
21. The task of the two tank divisions from the second echelon of the front will be the immediate penetration - after the break-through -

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of the armored infantry divisions and of the flanks of the break-through, since the enemy will immediately commit its two armored divisions to counterattack to eliminate breach. This will be done to secure the flanks, to hold down the two enemy armored divisions, and to enable the tank army to pass through the breach and continue to advance to the final front objective.


22. The depth of operations is calculated at 300 to 500 kilometers. Advances during the first day will be 25-30 kilometers, during the second and, possibly, the third day advance will be approximately 40 kilometers, and during the remaining days of the operation it will be 50-60 kilometers. An operation by an army lasts 6 to 8 days.

GHQ Officers Attached to Formation Headquarters

23. At each formation headquarters of armies and fronts, there are three representatives of General Headquarters (GHQ), with their staff (predstavitel'stvo glavno komandovani). The representatives are for operations, administration, and policy and politics. During World War II, Marshal Georgy Zhukov and Tolbukhin (fmr) were among these representatives.

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


24. The task of these representatives, who are generals and marshals, is to support and supervise formation commanders in the execution of their tasks. Each operation order of the army or front must be confirmed by the representatives, who are in direct contact with the Supreme Command. GHQ has also attached liaison officers (in Polish: ofiser kirunkowi) down to the divisional level. If an army disposes of four divisions, an officer-representative of operations is attached to each axis. A liaison officer may also appear at the regimental level if an important task has been assigned to a certain regiment and/or faulty execution there would impede the entire operation.

Air Force

25. There will be allocated an Air Army, which will consist of ten divisions of fighters and two divisions of bombers. Two regiments will be allotted during the night of advance to contact until the arrival at the river and the establishment of a bridgehead; one squadron will be permanently airborne (in Polish Zwano-6-8 aircraft).
26. Planning of air support is made at front headquarters. Factors influencing the planning are the number of sorties allotted each unit or mission, the types of bombs to be carried (for example,


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500-kilogram bombs for bridges of heavy iron construction, 100-kilogram bombs, etc.) and the types of aircraft.

27. The major part of aircraft is committed on the first day of operations. A front (in this example) will be allotted six jet aircraft divisions and two bomber divisions. Among these there will be one special bomber divisions for atomic bombs. The range of bombing aircraft is up to 2,500 kilometers. This includes range to target (airfield to front), 700 kilometers, and operational depth of front, 300 kilometers, constituting an operational radius of 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers. From this allocation of six divisions of jet aircraft and two bomber divisions, allotments will be made by the front as follows:
- a. To Army I, two jet divisions and one bomber division.
 - b. To Army II, one jet divisions and one bomber division.
 - c. To continue the assault, three jet divisions.
28. The attainment of air superiority over the sector of operations of the front, including the airfields serving it, is the responsibility of the front. The attainment of air superiority over


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front operations within the USSR and Satellites is the responsibility of the Supreme Command.

29. The tasks of the Air Force are the following:

- a. Close support.
- b. Attack by nuclear weapons.
- c. Airfields.
- d. Armored reserves of the enemy.
- e. Artillery positions and pieces.
- f. Command and observation posts.
- g. Communication centers.
- h. Roads and bridges.
- i. Stores.

30. Priority of missions is allocated by groups as follows:

- a. Air superiority - airfields, airborne aircraft.
- b. Destruction of reserves, - armor, artillery, first line.
- c. Harassment of fortifications and earthworks (organization of the ground.)
- d. Command posts.

31. Planning of air support (in Polish: lotnicze przygotowanie natarcia) has two phases:

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- a. Early air preparation (predvaritel'naya podgotovka nastupleniya) employed from D minus 3 until D minus 1. During this phase, aircraft attack targets and objectives at the tactical depth, particularly airfields, tank and artillery reserves.
- b. Immediate air preparations (neposredstvennaya podgotovka nastupleniya) employed from H minus two until H minus one. This phase is coordinated with the artillery support (artil'eritskaya podgotovka nastupleniya), the objective being the first line and the first belt.

All aircraft reserves are intended against enemy reserves on the move.

Artillery Support

- 32. Planning of artillery support at the army level is made by the commander of the army artillery, who is aided by his staff of approximately twenty men.

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33. The density of guns on one kilometer of the front, under nuclear conditions, is 120-130 guns/km. These include guns from 76 mm. up to 203 mm., including mortars. During artillery preparations for the attack, use of tank guns as artillery can be expected.
34. There is no artillery organization within the framework of a tank battalion or an armored infantry battalion, since allocation will be by batteries or one artillery battalion at the most.
35. Within the regiment there is a regimental artillery group (polkovaia artilerskaia grupa) which includes 4-5 field artillery battalions (12 guns). During 1956-1957, however, there was a tendency to increase the T/O of field artillery battalions to 18 guns. According to calculations, a field artillery battalion covers from four to six hectares (approximately ten to fifteen acres), where a battalion may be allotted four or five area targets as above.
36. Within the division there is a separate divisional artillery group which includes 4-6 field artillery battalions, or heavy mortars plus one rocket launcher battalion of 132 mm. guns (N-11 ?).

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37. There is a separate army artillery group within the army which includes 10-12 field artillery battalions and/or mortars and 1-2 heavy rocket battalions. The group is generally divided into two subgroups, which correspond to the former corps artillery groups. A subgroup includes 6-7 field artillery battalions and/or mortars. The tasks of the army artillery groups are counterbattery fire, using 122 mm. and 152 mm. guns, and support of the divisional artillery.
38. There are separate front artillery groups within the front, these are divided into subgroups according to the number of armies in the front. Missions of additional artillery correspond to those of army artillery.
39. Calculations for area coverage:
- a. For a field artillery battalion - 4-6 hectares (10-15 acres). There are 12-18 guns per battalion.
 - b. For one battery of 120 mm. heavy mortars - 4-6 hectares. There are 6-7 mortars per battery. There is one such battery in the armored infantry regiment.

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40. The artillery division contains one heavy mortar regiment of 160 mm. (30 or 36 heavy mortars.) The 160 mm. heavy mortar battery contains four mortars only. The targets allotted to the 160 mm. heavy mortar are more important objectives within the 7-8 kilometer range.
41. The artillery concentrations required for the offensive are drawn from the artillery assembled for this purpose from all second echelon and rear (reserve) units and brought forward to first echelon units (except 82 mm. medium mortars.)
42. Types of artillery fire are the following:
- a. Fire against targets - area coverage (Podavleni. unichtojeni).
 - b. Destructive fire.
 - c. Harassing fire. (in Polish: Ogienenkajacy).
 - d. Sealing off fire (Zagraditelnoi ogoni).
 - e. Moving fire (Podvijsnoi ogoni).
 - f. Waving fire (Ognivoi val).
43. Artillery support during attack (artilerskaja nastuplenie) is divided into the following three phases:

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- a. Artillery preparation prior to the assault, which lasts from 20 to 30 minutes (a maximum of 40 minutes) before H hour. The entire available artillery is engaged in the total tactical depth, starting from H minus 42, or 32, or 24-22. The interval of 2-4 minutes from the termination of preparation until H hour is to enable the infantry to traverse the ground. The phases of preparation are as follows:
- (1) Preparation commences with an artillery salvo on all enemy artillery reserves and the first line. This fire will maintain full volume during the first minutes, for a duration of 5-10 minutes.
 - (2) For 5-10 minutes, the major part of the artillery is engaged in first line positions. This, of course, does not include that portion of artillery which is allotted counterbattery fire tasks.

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- (3) For a duration of 5-10 minutes, fire by direct laying for destruction of targets, objectives, or point targets. Included in this fire task are 122 mm. guns. The general method is to consign one target for every two guns (one of which is held in reserve), calculated requirements for a target to be considered destroyed or neutralized - 15 shells.
- (4) A moving barrage (navala ogniova) (similar to (1) above), the final salvo of which is laid down on the first line.
- b. Artillery support of the assault. The final phase of the early preparatory fire signifies commencement of the second phase of the artillery support in the assault. This fire is laid down in two kinds of moving barrages, single and double:

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- (1) During a single barrage (ordinary val ogniovi) a specified number of guns lay down fire on the enemy mainline, after which there is shifting to the depth of enemy positions, secondary lines, etc.
- (2) During a double barrage (dvoynoy val ogniovi) artillery is divided into two sections, one section engaging the first line and the other engaging the line behind it. Allocation of fire sectors and enemy depth is made by linear divisions of 100-meter interval between lines. Lines passing over positions are the mainline, while all others are secondary lines. Fire is laid down on the mainline according to requirements, up to 10 minutes' duration. Fire is shifted from the mainline by order only. On a secondary line, fire is laid down automatically for a duration of up to 2 minutes, after which it is shifted automatically.

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- (3) In the event Soviet forces do not possess sufficient guns or ammunition or exact information as to the enemy layout is lacking, fire is laid down on objectives only, without regard to the lines. Such firing may also be considered in the event the enemy layout is based upon dispersed positions. The amount of fire laid-down will be at a rate of 5-10 minutes per objective, according to plan.
- (4) Supporting artillery fire during attack is laid down to a depth of 2.5-3 kilometers, up to the enemy's artillery positions. Depth of fire may be increased during good observation conditions.
- e. Artillery support in depth of the assault (Poderja boia v glubine). For fighting in the enemy defended

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area, regimental artillery groups are divided into artillery battalions allotted to infantry battalions under command. To each infantry battalion there are allotted 1-2 artillery battalions, with the regiment retaining 1-2 artillery battalions as reserve. The tasks of this support include the destruction of points of resistance and lines in depth, the protection of flanks, and the harassment of enemy reserves. Fire is laid down for area coverage only. The safety range for this support is 40-50 meters.

Defense of the Enemy

44. The description of organizing enemy ground in connection with a planned attack by Soviet troops (applicable also to Soviet defensive concepts) is as follows:

- a. The advanced line, or deception, (predevnaya pozitsiya vidvinuta) is sited at a depth of 3-5 kilometers and resembles the main belt in its

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
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construction. Its object is to camouflage the main belt. This advanced line is held by battalions drawn from the first line divisional reserves. The line, which is set up by order of the Army Commander, follows an oblique course:



- b. The tactical depth is generally estimated at 25-30 kilometers, this being the depth allocated to the first wave of the army. (The tactical depth was previously allocated to the corps.)
- c. The operational depth extends from 25-30 kilometers up to 200 kilometers. The operational depth of an army is 100-120 kilometers.
- d. Within the internal layout of the tactical depth there are two belts. The distance between

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the two belts is 10-15 kilometers, depending upon the terrain. The width of each belt is 5-10 kilometers, also depending upon the terrain.

- e. Within the internal layout of the operational depth there may be one or two belts, which will include operational lines. An operational belt may be located at a distance of 90-100 kilometers from the beginning of the tactical depth.
- f. There is also the possibility of a cover belt construction before the tactical depth. This belt may be constructed at a distance of 15-20 kilometers from the first line, depending on the type of terrain.
- g. The responsibility for the exact determination of the first line of the first belt and third belt rests with the Army Commander.
- h. The divisional headquarters is responsible for planning assaults up to depths of 15 kilometers,

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the army headquarters for depths up to 100-120 kilometers, and the front headquarters for depths beyond 100-120 kilometers.

Location of Command Groups and Headquarters

45. The regimental headquarters in the attack is divided into a command party, an advance headquarters, and a rear headquarters. The command party is located in the direction of the main effort, at a depth of 1-1.5 kilometers from the front line. The advance headquarters is located at the level of regimental reserves, the second echelon always being in the direction of the main effort and not in the vicinity of the artillery positions. On the average, its depth is 3-4 kilometers from the line of departure. The rear headquarters is located up to 10 kilometers from the line of departure.
46. The division is also divided into a command party, an advance headquarters and a rear headquarters. The command party is located at a depth of 1.5-2 kilometers from the line of departure, at the level of the battalions of the first wave. The

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advance headquarters is located at a depth of 6-8 kilometers from the line of departure and the rear headquarters up to 20 kilometers from the line of departure.

47. The command party is composed of the commanding officer, the operations, intelligence, engineer and signals officers, the support commanders, the representative of administration, and the representative of the Air Force (divisional headquarters and above.)
48. The advance (main) headquarters is composed of the chief of staff, the second operations officer, the intelligence branch, signals, the representative of administration, staff officer "A", and others. At the rear headquarters are all the remainder under command of the quartermaster officer.

Other Installations

49. The ammunition stores of the regiment are located 6-10 kilometers from the front line, while those of the division are 20 kilometers, i.e. at the rear headquarters level.
50. During attack, the casualty clearing stations of the regiment are 4-6 kilometers from the line of departure. Those of the division are 10-12 kilometers from the line of departure.

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51. The rations and fuel stores and the workshops of the division are located up to 30 kilometers from the line of departure.

Communications

52. The principle of communications is from left to right and from top to bottom. The types of communication nets are the operational net, among the headquarters, the commanders net, to the battalion level, and cooperational net. In addition, there are open sets for various nets, such as the nets between aircraft to the antiaircraft warning centers, from which data about enemy danger from the air is transmitted to units in the field.

Ammunition Requirements During Attack

53. Calculations of ammunition expenditure are based upon the following: During the first day of attack, 2-3 battle supplies are expended, while on the second and subsequent days, 1-1.5 battle supplies are expended. In regard to the dumping of ammunition, one-half to three-fourths battle supply will go to the gun plus battalion fighting echelon transport, one-fourth battle supply to the regiment, and one-fourth battle supply to the division.

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Food and Fuel Rations

54. One ration each is supplied to the battalion, regiment, and division. In addition, soldiers carry a 24-hour iron ration.
55. There is a total of two fuel rations: one ration for vehicles and tanks, one-fourth to one-half for the regiment, and one-half to three-fourths for the division.

Assault on a River

56. An assault on a river is usually carried out at twilight. The army headquarters gives the signal for the start of assault. Tanks advance up to the infantry line and both proceed to the assault. At H hour, tanks and infantry are at the enemy first line trenches. Passages through enemy mine fields are carried out inaudibly during the night by the assault pioneers 1-2 days preceding H hour. They can also be carried out during artillery preparation. There are also tanks equipped with chains for breaching minefields.
57. The first assault wave will not, in most cases, enter the enemy trenches, but will fight above them and break down the resistance. The clearing of positions is the task of units

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
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of the second line or echelon. It is taught that the first echelon generally breaks through and the second echelon mops up.

58. The regiment is allotted a first mission or mission of the day, as well as direction of attack in depth. The division is allotted a first mission or mission of the day and line to be reached at end of day. The division is also allotted a secondary mission. All of these missions are allotted in accordance with the presumed enemy disposition, as shown below:



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59. The depth of mission of the day for an armored infantry division is 25-30 kilometers. The tank army will enter the breach at an average width of 12 kilometers and at the depth of the first belt (10-12 kilometers). Prior to its introduction, the tank divisions of the combined army (obshe voiskovaya armiya) will be put in the breach. This should be done at night, so that they can be ready for the break-through at break of dawn. This will be difficult to do if the river must be crossed at the same time, since no bridge for tanks can be constructed during the first night.
60. There is one bridge to the division. The army has two or three independent bridges, one of which is a heavy bridge.
61. At the drop of a parachute regiment, two battalions are dropped in the first wave and two dropping points are immediately established (one battalion to each dropping point.) Within the battalion, companies are also organized into waves: "A" company constitutes the first wave and secures the dropping point, while "B" company enlarges the perimeter of the point, etc.
62. Each battalion has approximately twenty boats for river crossing. Companies cross in waves, with the first companies constituting

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the advance waves. The task of the advance waves is to occupy the river bank up to a depth of 500 meters. Boats of the advance wave stay with the wave. After the advance wave companies have crossed, the remaining companies cross over. Their boats, however, are returned. Efforts are made to include in the advance wave a very large quantity of automatic weapons plus antitank weapons, assault pioneers, and forward artillery observers.

63. If a river crossing proves too difficult, parachutists will be employed in exceptional cases. The general tendency is to avoid the employment of parachutists at the tactical depth and to concentrate upon the operational depth, to seize operational objectives. Parachutists are expected to be capable of holding out for 24 hours, at a distance of 80 kilometers from the line of departure.
64. Attacks, which will last 8-9 days, will not be interrupted. There exists no concept of reorganization; divisions operating in the main effort are withdrawn to the reserve for $\frac{1}{2}$ -1 day.

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Movement to Contact

65. Movement to contact is made by the three armored infantry divisions moving in the first line and the tank division in the second line, behind the armored infantry division in the center of the first line. Movement is made in columns of regiments. Each division moves along at least two axes, with protection on both flanks.


Defense

66. The forces allocated for defense are too large. The width of the frontal sector of a division in the defense is 15 to 30 kilometers, depending upon the estimate of where the enemy is likely to attempt its break-through. In this case, the solution is as follows:

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67. Disposition is such (due to the lack of maps) that the enemy will attempt to break through the disposition in the center, the width of the frontal sector of the center division being, therefore, 15 kilometers. The depth of the divisional disposition is 10-12 kilometers, and each division has a reserve of 1-2 battalions. The army has a reserve of one division, also

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occupying and manning defense belt No. 2. The mobile army reserves - two tank divisions - are deployed on the flanks of the disposition, at a distance of 25-40 kilometers, in such a manner as to enable them to attack any breach in the disposition from the flank.

68. The trenches are oblique (riglavaya positia). In regard to the deployment of units, a tank battalion deploys on 3-4 kilometers, a tank regiment on 20 square kilometers, and a tank division on 120 square kilometers.
69. On the opposite river bank there will be a covering belt. Patrols will be made along the entire line in this belt. Tasks of forces holding the belt will be maintained up to regimental level to indicate the direction of the main enemy effort and to impede enemy movement.
70. There will be 10-12 atomic bombs allotted to this army. They will be employed to break up enemy assaults, either during the counterbattery artillery or air preparation. An enemy will be attacked by atomic weapons only if exact information as to the final deployment of enemy for the attack is available. The timing will be H minus 2-3. The means used will be artillery

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concentration of atomic shells, According to two or three possibilities, atomic shells are fired for 10-20 minutes.

Support in Defense

71. The density of guns is 30 to 40 per kilometer. This includes only those guns layed indirectly and not antitank guns. Anti-tank defense layout is continued to the depth of the disposition, up to a density of 30 guns per kilometer of frontage in the direction of the main effort. Distribution of antitank guns in defense belt 1 will be 20 to 24 guns per kilometer. In the first line of the first belt the density will be 10-12 guns per kilometer, while in the second and third lines of the first belt the density will be 15-16 guns per kilometer. The principle of antitank defense is the establishment of mobile antitank artillery reserves. This is done from the regiment upward. Within these antitank defense reserves, there are included engineer units with a quantity of antitank mines.
72. During 1957, there appeared a tendency to establish an artillery reserve under conditions of atomic warfare, of 1-2 artillery regiments at army level, which will be employed only

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after the enemy has employed atomic weapons. The responsibility of siting antitank guns and medium machine guns on the flanks rests with the battalion commander. Artillery fire plan in the defense is prepared by the division only.

73. The following types of fire will be used in defense:

a. Harassing fire (podvijnoy sagraditel'noi ogoni).

One or two artillery battalions in the sector in the direction of the enemy main effort. Fire is laid down from a depth of 1.5-2 kilometers on each 200-300-meter line. Each battalion is allotted a sector of 200-250 meters. The rate of fire depends upon the enemy movement. This fire is laid down only under full observation, against enemy infantry and tanks.

b. Danger fire (in Polish (?) stale ogoni zaporowi), which is laid down at a distance of 200 meters from the first line, along the entire frontal sector. Each battery is allotted 2-3 fire sectors in accordance with the fire plan.

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- c. Fire on own positions (sagraditelnyi ogoni), which is to impede the enemy in the positions of the defense for outflanking operations.
- d. Concentrated fire (soaredotochenii ogoni), which is used for breaking up an attack and is laid down on enemy layout ready to assault.

Although chemical shells are in existence, they will be used only if the enemy employs them.

Confirmation of Orders

74. It is emphasized, mainly in the defense, that every order issued must be confirmed by the immediate superior. The regiment is required to obtain confirmation of orders from the division. Confirmation may also be given by the army.

Communications

75. Communications will be maintained by using two channels, either through two radios or one radio and one wire. Each order must be transmitted by two channels.

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Problem No. II
Controlling and Breaching of a Passage

Situation

76. A vital passage, consisting of a road and railroad, passes through a town with small, parallel streets of an area of 16 square kilometers (4 x 4 km). There exists no possibility of outflanking the passage. This layout is held by personnel with previous military service, organized within the framework of reserve units and supported by artillery and medium machine guns at the flanks.
77. The enemy, Russians, will have a strength of one armored infantry regiment, one tank battalion, and two artillery battalions, of 18 guns each.
78. Atomic shells or bombs may be requested. Passage must be effected within four or five hours.

Solution


79. An atomic strike will be delivered on the entire town, with point zero at the town center. One artillery battalion will deploy and will commence ranging and engaging antitank guns

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sited on the slopes. The tank battalion, in conjunction with the tanks of the armored infantry regiment, will by-pass the town and continue to advance toward the objective. Armored infantry will also pass through in a similar manner, without delay in the shelled area, with the artillery battalions bringing up the rear. It may also be possible for one artillery battalion to pass through with the tank battalion.

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Miscellaneous Data on the Soviet ArmyTanks in the Divisions

80. In the mechanized infantry division there are 69 tanks, which are distributed as follows:

- a. Five tank companies of 10 tanks each, making a total of 50.
- b. Two SU companies of 9 tanks destroyers each plus one tank destroyer of commander, making a total of 19.

81. In the mechanized division there are 162 tanks: one medium tank regiment with 72 tanks, one heavy tank regiment with 60 tanks, and three tank companies in the infantry regiments with 30 tanks.

82. The tank division has 230-240 tanks, inclusive of SU tank destroyers.

Pieces in the Mechanized Division

83. There are a total of 171 pieces in the mechanized division, distributed as follows:

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- a. 82 mm. medium mortars: Nine to each infantry battalion, making a total of 81.
- b. 120 mm. heavy mortars: Six to each infantry regiment, making a total of 18.
- c. 122 mm. heavy howitzers: Eighteen to each artillery battalion, making a total of 72.

Fighting Strength of Units

84. In the company there are 120 combat soldiers, in the battalion there are 500, in the regiment 1,800, and in the division 9,000.

Motor Transport

85. In the infantry company there are 7 motor transport vehicles, in the infantry battalion there are up to 60, and in the infantry regiment there are up to 300.

There appeared to be a tendency in 1957 to decrease the number of tanks and "B" vehicles in units of all echelons.

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COUNTRY:

USSR

SUBJECT:

**Soviet Military Tactics: Attack by Three
Army Groups on a 100-Kilometer Front**

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Planned Attack

1. In the attack one division is allocated a frontage of two to five km, and it deploys at a depth of three to four km. Although such a concentration invites an atomic strike, it was

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taught that the enemy will not attack his own first and second line; therefore, contact with the enemy and proximity to his lines of defense will prevent the use of enemy atomic weapons.

2. Directly subordinate to the Front rear services command (in Russian: Upravlenie Tila Fronta; in Polish: Kwater-Mistrzostwo Frontu) there are regiments and battalions for the collection and safeguarding of captured materiel. Immediately upon the entry of Russian forces into enemy territory, these units register the materiel properly. After inspecting the equipment, they transfer part of it to the Russian forces for their use; samples of modern equipment are withheld and forwarded to technical intelligence for inspection. If a retreat from the area is necessary, these units are in charge of organizing the evacuation of the captured materiel. In 1945, during World War II, the Russians parachuted such units, together with technical intelligence officers, behind the enemy lines in order to guard against German destruction of granaries in the town of Valtch. The Front rear services command has such a department, called the "Trofeyniy Otdel"; the command, on the strength of its assessment of the logistic

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situation, gives the location of enemy supplies, his plants, and the potential of the enemy about to be attacked.

3. The Front rear services command has a potential exploitation department (Eksplotatsionnyi Otdel) whose representatives exploit the enemy's potential by operating those of his installations which have not been destroyed. The representatives operate on the logistic principle that in an attack, the entire quartermaster ("Q") branch and maintenance system should be based on the enemy's potential, and that transfer of food, fuel and other supplies from the rear should be avoided. For the operation of enemy plants, these representatives endeavor to mobilize the same people who had previously worked at the plant concerned.

4. Attached to the operations order of the Front is a "Q" branch appendix issued in the name of the Front rear services commander. Before the execution of a "Q" branch operations order, an assessment is made of the logistic situation and a "Q" branch survey is organized of the service branches subordinate to the Front rear services command.

5. In an attack, the locations of headquarters are as follows:

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a. The staff of the Front is divided into two parts: the forward headquarters and the rear headquarters. In addition there is a separate rear services headquarters.

b. The composition of the Front forward headquarters is not fixed beforehand but is left to the discretion of the individual commander.

c. The Front rear headquarters is the Front staff and takes charge of all units of the Front from the general staff branch aspect.

d. The Front rear services command is in charge of the administrative and logistic (Q) problems of the Front. In most cases a forward liaison headquarters is sent from Front rear services headquarters for coordination with Front headquarters. The Front rear services command is not located together with the rear headquarters of the Front in order to prevent a large concentration of commanders and staffs.

e. Location of headquarters according to distances:

(1) Front forward headquarters: up to 30 km from the front line.

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(2) Front rear headquarters: 80 - 100 km from the front line.

(3) Front rear services command: up to 100 km from the front line.

f. In an exercise conducted in northern Poland in 1955, headquarters and forces were posted as follows:

(1) Forward headquarters of the Front - did not exist.

(2) Rear headquarters of the Front - in Valtch [possibly Walcz, N 53-16, E 16-28], 130 km from the front.

(3) Front rear services command - in Pila (N 53-09, E 16-45), 150 km from the front.

(4) Rear installations of the Front - in Pila and Bydgoszcz (220 km from the front)

(5) First Army - in Szczecinek (N 53-43, E 16-42)

(6) Second Army - in Drawsko (N 53-32, E 15-48) and Miastko (N 54-00, E 16-59).

(7) Tank corps - in Bituv [possibly Bytow, N 54-10, E 17-30]

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(8) Air Force in Pilo (Pila)

g. With regard to Army headquarters, it is not known whether forward headquarters existed. Rear headquarters was up to 15 km from the front, and Army rear services command was located up to 40 km from the front.

Movement to Contact

6. It was discovered that the commanders had a tendency to leave the "Q" branch convoys behind when moving their forces forward. The problem came to the fore in 1955 at the conclusion of an exercise of movement to contact in which Front forces moved on an axis from Warsaw to the north. This exercise allowed simultaneous movement in three convoys; however, there was a bottleneck at one bridge which permitted only one-way traffic. Since each commander of a force had left his "Q" branch convoys behind and had crossed the bridge with only his forces, the resultant delay held up for three days the advance of the forces in Army strength. At the discussion of the manoeuvre, which took place at the office of G. Poplawski, Deputy Minister of Defense for general affairs, the rear services command was found guilty of disturbing and stopping the force for a period of three days.

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
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After much discussion, an order was issued which forbade a commander to leave behind his "Q" branch convoys during a movement to contact; the commander was obliged to take them along until the time of battle.

Defense

7. Until 1953 the "mobile defense to the rear" (Obrona Ruchoma) concept was taught everywhere. The principle was to delay an enemy superior to our forces and to compel him to fight over a number of defense lines which have been prepared in advance.

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If enemy forces attack Belt I and breach it, the forces pass through Belt II by movement A and form a new defense line at Belt III. If the enemy breaches Belt II, our forces pass from there by a movement to positions in Belt IV. (This method requires the acceptance of the principle of giving up ground in order to destroy the enemy forces.) In 1953 this method was virtually discarded and since then it has been continually emphasized that "mobile defense to the rear" was ineffectual and should only be employed in rigid static defense as in the solution.

8. A division in defense will receive a frontage of 8 - 30 km; there were instances in which a division on an auxiliary axis received up to 45 km frontage. The depth of the divisional defense disposition is up to 30 km, the main forces of the division deploying at a depth of only six km. The entire defense layout of the division is called "Pas Obron Y Dywizji" and is divided into three belts (Posycia), each of which has three lines. In addition to these, there are oblique lines P (in Polish: Posycia Gluchowa) in the depth of the defense disposition, which


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allow for moving the Soviet forces to the depth during the fighting in their fortified disposition.



9. Location of Headquarters:

- a. Rear headquarters of a Front - up to 130 km from the front line.
- b. Front rear services command - up to 150 km from the front line.
- c. Rear headquarters of an Army - up to 40 km from the front line.
- d. Army rear services command - 70 to 80 km from the front line.

10. Ammunition rations at each piece:

- a. 76 mm gun, 82^{mm} mortar: 120 shells

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b. 122 mm gun and howitzer and 120 mm heavy mortar: 90 shells

c. 152 mm gun and howitzer and 160 mm heavy mortar: 60 shells

11. Ammunition rations for each piece (except tanks), as per table of allowance:

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------|
| a. In the regiment | - 1.5 rations |
| b. In the division | - 0.5 |
| c. In the Army | - 1.0 |
| d. In the Front | - 2.0 |

Total 5.0 rations per piece

12. Ammunition rations for each tank as per table of allowance:

- | | |
|--------------------|-------------|
| a. In the regiment | - 2 rations |
| b. In the division | - 1 |
| c. In the Army | - 1 |
| d. In the Front | 2 |

Total 6 rations per tank

13. Food rations:

- | | |
|--------------------|----------|
| a. In the regiment | - 3 days |
| b. In the division | - 2 days |

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c. In the Army - 10 days

d. In the Front - 15 days

 Total: 30 days

14. Fuel, other than for tanks, calculated per tank truck:

a. In the regiment - 1.5 tank truck

b. In the division - 0.5

c. In the Army - 1.0

d. In the Front - 1.0

 Total: 4 tank trucks

15. Fuel for tanks, calculated per tank truck:

a. In the regiment - 1.5 - 2 tank trucks

b. In the division - 0.5 - 1

c. In the Army - 1

d. In the Front - 1

 Total: (according to mission) 4 - 5 tank trucks

16. Defense layout, measurements:

<u>Type of Unit</u>	<u>Frontage</u>	<u>Depth of Main Forces</u>
Battalion	1.5 - 2 km	1.5 km
Regiment	4 - 5 km	3 - 4 km
Division	10 - 12 km	5 - 6 km